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Most structural and some nonstructural water projects
require significant sunk costs and lead to uncertain
economic and ecological outcomes. For instance,
building irrigation or flood control dam requires sizable
sunk cost, an investment that is difficult to recover later.
The dam faces uncertainties in terms of future rainfall,
the performance of the dam’s structures and
downstream levees, the economic activities that affect
the demand for irrigation water or flood control, and
ecological impacts, particularly the society’s valuation
of these impacts. Some of these uncertainties are
inherent and are difficult to reduce by gathering more
information. Examples include long-range weather
uncertainties, biological variations such as the natural
growth rate of a fish population, and possibly levee
performance. But other uncertainties can typically be
mitigated by further information gathering. For
example, new information naturally arrives regarding
economic activities and even the valuation of the
ecological impacts as more data become available.

economic development) be used to select the best
alternative.
In this paper, I discuss how the real options approach
can be applied to water project assessment. I start with a
short description of the real option theory, followed by a
discussion of the conditions under which this theory can
be applied to water projects. I then present an example,
the American River Watershed Project, to show how the
new approach can help project selection and
formulation.
REAL OPTION THEORY
One of the early motivations of real option theory was
the uncertainty and irreversibility of natural resources
development (Arrow & Fisher, 1974). When the
development is irreversible, e.g., when the initial
investment is sunk, or when the damage to the natural
environment cannot be repaired, uncertainty implies that
it is possible the development proves to be suboptimal
in hindsight. Anticipating this possibility, the
decisionmaker may have incentive to delay the
development until more information becomes available,
or to devise measures that maintain certain degrees of
flexibility, such as by reducing the project size. In either
way, the probability of “regretting” the irreversible
investment is reduced. A project should be valued
together with the associated future options, and the
decision is made not only in terms of the scale of the
project, but also its timing.

With sunk costs, uncertainty and future learning, the
traditional method of project evaluation based on the
expected net present value is not efficient as it does not
fully account for the value of future information in
selecting and formulating the alternatives. In this paper,
I discuss a new method of evaluation, called the real
options approach, which can be used to deal with these
kinds of projects. This method argues that, given the
prospects of future information, projects that allow
future flexibility to respond to the new information
should be given more weight. The flexibility has a
value, called option value, similar to the financial call or
put options. Further, a given project may need to be
postponed if the option value is high. The real options
approach is being rapidly adopted in neoclassical
investment analysis (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994) and in
capital budgeting practices (Trigeorgis, 1996).

To see the role of information and timing, consider the
following stylized example of an investment project that
costs $84 million and will last forever. Suppose the
payoff of this project in the current period is known and
equals p=$10 million. Uncertainty in future payoffs
arises due to a special regulation being debated. The
nature of the regulation will become clear the next year,
and the project’s future annual payoff will be either
0.5p=$5 million or 1.5p=$15 million, depending on the
outcome of the regulation. Based on the current
information, the regulation can either be favorable or
unfavorable with equal probability. The discount rate is
ten percent.

The real options approach has not been adopted in water
project assessment, although it has attracted attention in
general policy analysis (Metcalf & Rosenthal, 1995).
The Principles and Guidelines, an assessment manual
for federal water projects, explicitly describes how
uncertainty should be incorporated in project evaluation.
It requires the expected benefits and costs be calculated,
and expected net present value (called NED-national

The expected present value of the project is (10/0.1)84=$16 million, so the expected net present value
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(NPV) approach would suggest investing now. But
consider the alternative of holding the project and
waiting one more year until the nature of the regulation
is known. If in year two, the regulation turns out to be
unfavorable, no investment is undertaken (since the
payoff of $5 each year cannot overcome the investment
cost of $84). If the regulation turns out to be favorable,
the project is executed and the payoff is 15/0.1-84=$66
million. Given the probabilities of the two scenarios, the
expected present value of the payoff of waiting in
period one is (0.5)(66)/1.1=$30 million, which is higher
than the payoff of investing now ($16 million). Thus,
waiting generates a higher expected payoff than
executing the project in period one. Note that the value
of not investing now, given the option of investing later,
is $30 million, rather than zero.

components can be delayed; and (4) there are
adjustment costs in reversing the project or its
components. Some of these conditions epitomize the
main features of water projects. As Reisner (1986)
argues, the root of the current environmental challenges
facing many water projects in the Western U.S. lies in
the difficulty of reversing earlier developments
(condition (4)) which are deemed excessive based on
new information such as people’s tastes for the
environment (conditions (1) and (2)). Next we discuss
how these conditions arise in and their implications for
water project formulation.
Uncertainty and Future Information
We discussed earlier that a water project faces an array
of uncertainties in both the natural and social-economic
factors that affect its net payoff. Future information
may arrive for some of these factors. Compared with the
uncertainty and risk analysis procedure currently
required in the Principles and Guidelines, real option
theory demands description not only of the uncertain
factors, but also the likelihood and nature of future
information about these factors.

This example illustrates that the expected NPV criterion
can lead to an inefficient decision in project assessment.
An essential feature of the real options approach is that
projects should be valued in a dynamic framework. In
our example, where only one investment alternative is
provided, this alternative has to compete with itself at a
later date (and with more information). Through
delaying the project, a more informed decision can be
made that avoids some (or all, as in this example)
downside risks. The cost of delaying arises from
discounting: the earlier the investment, the earlier the
net benefits start to accrue.

Characterizing possible future information is not
conducting a point forecast of the values of the random
variables of interest. Rather, it requires specifying the
possible future signals that can shed light on the
variables’ values, and how these signals relate to the
variables. For example, if the random variable is growth
in urban demand for drinking water, the signals may be
population growth or a new water rate structure in the
future. The decisionmaker may describe several
scenarios in which these signals evolve (i.e., the
possible values of the signals), the time when the signals
can be observed, and the likely demand for water under
each scenario.

A water project may involve many components, some
of which can be delayed and others cannot. Some
components may in fact be partially reversible, subject
to certain adjustment costs. Different combinations of
the components form competing project alternatives,
each with its own degree of irreversibility and cost of
delay. Projects with multiple components have been
studied in the real options literature. Both Dixit and
Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1996) review studies of
multiple options, where investments on a project’s
components are executed in a certain order. Facing
uncertainty, a decisionmaker may choose to invest in
some components, holding off others until more
information becomes available. For example, an oil
company may choose to undertake exploration in a
field, but postpone extraction until more favorable
market conditions materialize.

If the water project takes a lengthy time to complete, or
if the components of the project are executed
sequentially, performance of the finished components
may generate information that can help the design (or
redesign) of later components. For example, suppose an
irrigation project involves expanding the storage
capacity of an existing dam in the first stage, and
possibly a new dam in the second stage depending on
the future demand. Suppose further that by observing
how water consumption responds to the increased water
supply after completion of the first stage, the policy
maker can obtain more information about the future
demand. Then the new information after the first stage
may help determine the necessity and the scale of the
second component. In fact, in this case, the design of the
first stage should even be modified to generate more
information about the future demand, if the information

REAL OPTIONS IN WATER PROJECTS
As indicated in the previous section, the real options
approach is more efficient than the expected NPV
criterion if a water project satisfies all of the following
conditions: (1) the outcome of the project is uncertain;
(2) future information can be gathered that helps better
evaluate the project; (3) the project or some of its
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is important. Ceteris paribus, components with higher
information contents, i.e., those that generate more
information about the uncertainties, should be executed
earlier.

Elwha River (in the Olympic National Park in the state
of Washington) was debated for decades before the
Record of Decision was signed in 1996. The acquisition
of the dams by the Department of Interior was
completed only in 2000. However, individual
components of a large water project may be reversible
at relatively low costs, and even when a project is not
reversible, there are measures that can partially reverse
the impacts of the water project. The restoration efforts
by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps are
aimed precisely at (partially) mitigating the damages of
the existing water projects, particularly large dams, on
biological resources.

Possibility of Delay
Whether or not a water project or some of its
components can be postponed for more information
depends on the specific circumstances surrounding the
project. Delay can be extremely costly in some cases.
For example, facing imminent flooding risk, postponing
preventive measures such as strengthening levees may
lead to devastating results. The cost of delay can be
relatively low in other cases, arising mainly from
discounting. For instance, without strong demand for
irrigation water, building a major irrigation and
hydroelectric dam can be delayed for more information.
Different components of a major project may also have
different costs of delay. If works on levees and other
existing flood control facilities provide sufficient
protection against flooding in the short run, major
components such as building a new flood control dam
can be delayed. Finally, the components may have to
occur in a certain order, i.e., delaying a certain
component may postpone other subsequent components,
raising the cost of delay.

Allowing costly restoration is likely to raise the
expected payoff of a water project, since restoration
adds an option of mitigating the damages or increasing
the benefits if ex post the project causes serious
damages. It also favors more projects or components
that are less costly to reverse. For example, if a water
regulation leads to too much environmental damage, it
may be reversed relatively easily. But if an irrigation
dam severely reduces the fish population, restoration
can be very costly. Then other things equal, the
nonstructural measure (i.e., the regulation) should be
favored relative to the structural measure (i.e., the dam).
Of course, some of the non-structural measures require
significant policy changes that are difficult to make or
reverse, leading to policy related option values
themselves (Pindyck, 1999; Zhao & Kling, 2000).

A water project typically includes numerous
components, and the formulation process of alternative
project plans involves specifying these components and
forming different combinations of them. According to
the real options approach, the cost of delay and the
information contents should be considered in
formulating the individual components and in forming
and choosing the combinations. Ceteris paribus,
components with lower costs of delay and higher
information contents are preferred, because of their
higher net values, which include both the expected
payoffs and the associated option values. If possible,
components with higher information content and higher
costs of delay should be executed earlier.

AN EXAMPLE
To illustrate how the real options approach can be
applied to water projects, we analyze a study conducted
by the Army Corps in 1995 to provide flood protection
for the Sacramento area in California, the American
River Watershed Project. The study was conducted to
supplement the Corps’ 1991 American River Watershed
Investigation Feasibility Report, which recommended
construction of levee in Natomas area and a flood
detention dam near Auburn area.

Sometimes there exist methods that can reduce the costs
of delay for some projects. Non-structural measures
such as flood zone management or water markets can
reduce the cost of delaying a flood control dam or an
irrigation dam. In project design, policymakers should
also consider such measures that mainly serve to reduce
the delay costs of other components.

BACKGROUND
The reassessment of flood risk in the Sacramento area
following the February 1986 “storm of record”
indicated that the existing protection is substantially
below 100-year level. Further study indicated that the
Sacramento area needs at least 200-year protection. The
Corps considered 17 individual flood protection
measures, selected 6 of them (through incremental
analysis) to form an initial array of 9 alternatives, and
finally considered 3 candidate plans in detail. The
Folsom Modification Plan involves some work on
Folsom Reservoir (such as increasing its flood storage

Adjustment Costs in Reversing Earlier Development
Large-scale water projects such as major dams are
difficult or impossible to be completely reversed. The
proposal to remove two (relatively small) dams on the
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and lowering the main spillway) and some levee work
along lower American River. It provides 180-year
protection. The Folsom Stepped Release Plan requires
more work on Folsom Reservoir (such as modifying
surcharge storage space and increasing the objective
release) and downstream American River, and achieves
235-year protection. The Detention Dam Plan includes a
508-foot-high flood detention dam with a detention
capacity of 894,000 acre-feet near Auburn (a dry dam
with the option of converting into permanent irrigation
or hydroelectric dam in the future), and some work
along lower American River. It provides 500-year
protection. Table 1 presents the components of the three
plans.

to calculate the net economic values. These figures are
presented in Table 2, where a discount rate of 7.75
percent is used to calculate the NPVs. The National
Economic Development (NED) plan is thus the
Detention Dam Plan.
Uncertainties
Water runs through the upper American River into
Folsom Reservoir, which subsequently releases the
water (subject to operation procedures) into downstream
American River. The discharge causes water in lower
American River to reach certain stages (different points
along the river may have different stages). Depending
on the levee system and other features of the river, there
is a probability of levee failure and flooding for each
stage of river water. The actual damage of flooding
depends on the magnitude of the flood and features of
the flood plain development. The process of rainfall
causing flood damages is illustrated in Figure 1.

For each plan, the Corps evaluated its expected
reduction in flood risk, and based on the flood zone
structures/values, the expected reduction in flood
damage (which is also the expected benefit of flood
prevention). It then compared the benefits with the costs
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Figure 1. The Process of Flood Damage

54

Flood Damage
(D)

Therefore, flood damage can be summarized by a
function, mapping the state variables of the system into
flood damage: D = f (S ) , where S = ( N , A , M , R , Y , P) is
a vector of the state variables, including rainfall level
(N), the storage capacity of Auburn Dam (A), the state
of Folsom Reservoir operation (M), the capacity of
American River (R), the state of the levee system along
American River (Y), and the structure value in the flood
zone (P). These variables also describe the uncertainties
of the Project, because the values of these variables are
typically stochastic. The uncertainties are described by
the distributions of the state variables.

imminent slow down that is expanding from Silicon
Valley. In examining the Corps’ study, I therefore focus
on the economic uncertainty and its impacts on the
Project’s evaluation.
Project Components
Of the three plans the Corps considered, there is
substantial overlap of the components between the
Folsom Modification Plan and the Stepped Release
Plan, as shown in Table 1. The Stepped Release plan
essentially expands the Modification plan by adding
more independent components downstream from the
Folsom Reservoir, thereby increasing the flood control
capability. The Detention Dam Plan replaces most of
the components of the other two by the proposed
Auburn Dam.

The purpose of the Project is to adopt measures to
change the values, or more precisely the distributions, of
the state variables so as to reduce the expected flood
damage. For example, building Auburn Dam raises A
and reduces floodwater ni flow to Folsom. Increasing
flood storage in Folsom enhances the performance of
Folsom M, and reduces the outflow for a given inflow
of floodwater. Raising levees along downstream
American River improves levee performance Y, and
reduces the probability of flooding for a certain river
stage. Proper flood plain management curtails the
structure value subject to flooding P, and reduces the
magnitude of damage for a certain flood level.
Comparing the distributions of the state variables before
and after a certain plan, the Corps calculated the
expected reduction of flood damage, or the flood
prevention benefits of this plan.

As we discussed in the last section, a key feature of the
real options approach is allowing responses to future
new information. We cannot completely specify the
possible future responses without a detailed engineering
analysis. However, for illustration purposes, we can
consider a plan that starts with Folsom Modification,
with the option of expanding it to Stepped Release if the
new information deems the expansion necessary. We
call this alternative the Optional Release Plan.
The Optional Release Plan
Suppose after some time, say ten years, there will be
new information about the economic development and
thus the benefits of flood control in the Sacramento
area. With the new information, estimates about the
annual benefits of the three plans will be modified.
Suppose the nature of the uncertainties and the new
information is such that the annual benefits can be 50
percent lower or 50 percent higher than the current
estimate, with equal probability.1 Folsom Modification
will be expanded to Stepped Release only if the new
information indicates the expansion to be optimal. The
cost of the expansion is the cost of the additional
components in the Stepped Release, which is 528327=201 million dollars (see Table 2).

The Corps considered the uncertainties of rainfall N,
Folsom Reservoir performance M, and lower American
River flow performance R, but ignored uncertainties of
levee performance Y and flood plain development
represented by structure value P. It argued that the
magnitude of the economic uncertainty is low because
the social economic structure in the flood plain was
known. However, since the project is to provide flood
prevention for over 100 years, the future social
economic uncertainties will be of a very high
magnitude. In addition, although the hydraulic and
hydrologic characters may not change a lot during the
100 years of project life, the social economic characters
will involve significant changes in this period.

The costs and benefits of the expansion option are
presented in Table 3. If in ten years, new information
indicates that the flood benefit is high, i.e., 50 percent
higher than the current estimate, the additional benefit
of the expansion, at $22.5 million per year, more than
compensates the required cost of the expansion. In this
case, Folsom Modification should be expanded to
Stepped Release, and the net benefit, discounted to
period zero, is about $42 million. If, however, new
information indicates that the annual benefit of flood

The real options approach requires that, in addition to
describing the uncertainties of S, the Corps should also
estimate the future evolution of information about S.
Such information is most likely to occur for economic
uncertainty, since economic activities are more likely to
experience significant changes in the future. The
economic volatility has been highlighted by the
economic boom in the region in recent years, and the
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control is lower than expected, the additional benefit of
expansion cannot justify the costs, and Folsom
Modification will not be expanded. In this case, nothing
will be done in year ten, and there are no additional
costs or benefits. Since there is a 50 percent probability
that the expansion will occur, the expected benefit of the
expansion option is 0.5*42=21 million dollars. Thus the
net benefit of the Optional Release is the sum of the
benefits of Folsom Modification and the expansion
option, or 576 + 21 = 597 million dollars.

together with the expected payoffs of the projects to
select the best alternative. Kolstad (1996) presents a
conceptual framework for analyzing such tradeoffs.
The real options approach also incurs additional costs of
more careful formulation of the project components,
future information, and necessary future adjustments.
The additional flexibility may also invite more
opportunities for “manipulation” of the data. A
standardized procedure of carrying out such analysis is
needed for the approach to reach its full potential.

The benefits of the option and the Optional Release
increase in the amount of future information (or the
level of current uncertainty), and in the speed at which
the information arrives. More information increases the
value of the option that uses the new information. The
speed of the new information matters because of
discounting. For example, if in year ten the annual
benefits of flood control will be 80 percent higher or
lower than expected, the value of the option becomes
$35 million. On the other hand, if the same amount of
information (i.e., 50 percent) arrives in year five, instead
of year ten, the value of the option is about $31 million.
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Table 1. Plan Components

Components
Folsom Dam and Reservoir
• Lower spillway crest and replace main gates
• Extend stilling basin
• Enlarge eight existing river outlets
• Modify surcharge storage operation
• Replace three emergency gates
• Increase flood control storage space
• Maintain flood control storage space
• Telemeter upstream gage /emergency warming system
• Increase objective release
Lower American River
• Slurry wall
• Raise Levees
• Other modifications
Downstream from American River
• Modify Sacramento weir and bypass
• Modify Yolo bypass levees
Natomas
Additional levee construction
Upstream
• Auburn Dam

Plans
Fixed Cost
Annual benefit
NPV

Folsom
Modification

Stepped
Release

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

•

Detention
Dam

•

•
•
•

•

•
•
•

•
•

Table 2. Plan Costs and Benefits (million dollars)
Folsom Modification
Stepped Release
327
528
70
85
576
568

Auburn Dam
934
134
794

Table 3. Costs and Benefits of Expansion (million dollars)
Higher Benefit

Lower Benefit

105
127.5
201
22.5
88.97
42.18

35
42.5
201
7.5
<0
<0

Annual Benefits
Folsom Modification
Stepped Release
Fixed Cost of Expansion
Annual Benefit of Expansion
Net Benefit of Expansion
NPV (year zero) Benefit
END NOTES
1

The annual benefits are calculated taking into consideration of future economic growth. New information thus can
be about the level of the achieved growth after ten years, or the future growth rate. For example, if there is
substantial inflow of investment from Silicon Valley, the estimates will have to be modified.
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